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 Abstract 
 
The recent growth in the movement of global funds has raised concerns about 
the potential for systemic risk in the payments system. Given the sheer growth 
and large volume of transactions currently processed through such payment 
systems, participating financial institutions contract serious intraday credit 
exposure. Such exposure can give rise to settlement failures and consequently, 
systemic risk. To prevent such settlement failures from turning into a systemic 
crisis, central banks and regulatory authorities need to play a balancing act -- 
while filling the potential liquidity gap as implicit guarantors of the settlement 
system, they must catalyse risk reduction policies to reduce the externality 
problem, that is to reduce systemic risk. This paper examines the extent to 
which different settlement systems affect the nature and potential vulnerability 
of the financial system to systemic risks. An important consideration 
throughout the analysis is whether externalities can be reduced if individual 
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The recent growth in the movement of global funds has raised 
concerns about the potential for systemic risk in the payments 
system.
1 The payments system is the channel through which funds are 
transferred between financial institutions in the form of electronic 
debit and credit-book entries. Given the sheer growth and large 
volume of transactions currently processed through such payment 
systems, participating financial institutions contract serious intraday 
credit exposure. Such exposure can give rise to settlement failures and 
consequently, systemic risk. To prevent such settlement failures from 
turning into a systemic crisis, central banks and regulatory authorities 
need to play a balancing act -- while filling the potential liquidity gap 
as implicit guarantors of the settlement system, they must catalyse risk 
reduction policies to reduce the externality problem, that is to reduce 
systemic risk.  
 
This paper examines the extent to which different settlement systems 
affect the nature and potential vulnerability of the financial system to 
systemic risks. An important consideration throughout the analysis is 
whether externalities can be reduced if individual institutions fully 
internalise the costs of their actions. The proposed standards for 
payments and risk control features (Lamfalussy Report), including the 
length of time during which participants are exposed to credit and 
liquidity risks, are addressed (BIS, 1993). Moreover, given the 
international nature of present day payment settlements, the role of 
various regulatory and legal structures need to be considered. The 
paper discusses the role of public intervention through prudent 
regulation in the payments system by considering the cost, risk, and 
efficiency arguments for reducing systemic risk through various 
systems. Economic theory suggests that government action can be 
justified if there is an externality. Systemic crises can cause the 
economy to suffer from suboptimal economic performance which can 
  3affect society as a whole. The ultimate effects of a “chain reaction” 
failure of financial institutions can exact economy wide losses which 
were not accounted for in the original costs. Clearly, the risk 
preceding such systemic crises implies lost economic efficiency and 
therefore calls for appropriate pre-emptive regulatory responses. In so 
far as payment systems generate externalities, their prices need to 
reflect the appropriate incentive schemes for financial institutions. 
There has already been some debate between countries on the 
appropriate design of payment systems reflecting their different 
approaches to regulation. While the EU has been leaning towards 
systems with collateralised overdrafts, the U.S. prefers a non-
collateralised system with a fee for overdrafts. 
 
A significant cost of reduction in payments-related credit in 
settlements systems through charges on overdrafts and 
collateralisation is the pressure to create private sub-management 
systems as low cost alternatives. Consequently, the very reasons – 
namely, better risk management – for which collateralised methods 
are replacing other systems are undermined. As regulators, the 
ultimate goal is to find methods to internalise the costs of such 
activities, and the creation of intermediate private netting markets 
might only serve to introduce further credit risk into the system. Thus, 
if the ultimate responsibility is to lie with the lenders of last resort, it 
might be easier for central banks to avoid agency problems by 
actively managing such risk themselves and discouraging such private 
sub-management systems. With any system, the systemic nature 
inherent in a single settlement failure requires the establishment of 
minimum regulatory standards whether in terms of interest charges, 
collateralisation requirements, or loss sharing agreements. The paper 
concludes by discussing the establishment of such standards and the 
associated trade-offs between their costs and ability to reduce risk. 
 
  42. Background 
 
2.1.  Systemic Risk -- An Externality Problem 
 
Systemic risk is to financial markets what dirty smoke is to the 
environment. In calculating the cost of production, the factory owner 
fails to account for the costs which the smoking chimney imposes on 
society. The dirty smoke is an externality. Its production has an 
impact on the welfare of society, but that impact is external and it is 
not priced through the market. The factory owner does not pay for the 
extra costs of laundry or for the medical bills the smoke precipitates. 
This failure introduces a fundamental shortcoming into the workings 
of the market so that the costs to the factory do not reflect the costs of 
the pollution to society as a whole. The result is pollution. The factory 
produces more smoke than would be the case if all society’s costs 
were accounted for in the factory’s balance sheet. Similarly, financial 
firms do not always price the costs that their losses might impose on 
society as a whole into their activities. Taking risks is what financial 
institutions are for, but markets, in reflecting only the private 
calculation of risk, underprice the risk faced by society. Consequently, 
similar to pollution, investors in free markets may participate in 
excessive risk taking. (Eatwell and Taylor, forthcoming)  
 
The debate on payments settlement systems has concentrated on the 
appropriate pricing of credit exposure to account for negative 
externalities caused by settlement failures. Such failures could be the 
result of time delays, institutional shortcomings, or liquidity gaps. 
Each of these issues could lead to serious systemic crises, and 
therefore the role of guarantor becomes crucial for the success of the 
entire financial system. At the same time, it is also important that the 
guarantor establish appropriate incentives to reduce moral hazard 
behaviour. While the central bank acts as the ultimate guarantor, it 
also needs to foster a greater sense of responsibility within market 
participants through appropriate regulation. Herein lies the critical 
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need to reduce unnecessary credit exposure.  
 
2.2. Payment  Systems 
 
There are two types of payments systems: real time gross settlement 
(RTGS) and multilateral netting system. The most important feature of 
an RTGS system is that it provides instant settlement with finality as 
soon as a payment order arrives provided that sufficient funds are 
available in the account of the sending bank. Settlement refers to the 
actual transfer of funds from a sending to a receiving bank. Finality 
means that the settlement is unconditional and irrevocable. In an 
RTGS system, real time implies that payment orders are continuously 
executed while gross settlement means that for each payment order, 
the total gross amount of funds is transferred. Settlements in netting 
systems do not occur immediately upon receipt of payment orders. 
The system immediately informs the receiver if the order meets some 
minimum criteria, but the actual settlement does not occur until the 
end of the day. At this point, the system calculates the net payments or 
settlement obligations for all participants and then the settlements are 
completed.  
 
A crucial difference between RTGS and netting systems is that netting 
systems only have contingent finality. Although most netting systems 
disallow any retraction of the orders and in this sense the orders are 
final, the finality is conditional upon the probability of settlement 
failure. That is, if a failure occurs because one or more participants in 
the system have insufficient funds, the netting system has to allow 
them to rescind their orders. Therefore, the finality is highly 
dependent on the daily success of settlement. Netting systems are also 
different in that they do not need to be operated by a single settlement 
agent since the system has two separate operations: clearing and 
settling. The clearinghouse receives and records all payment orders 
and checks whether the minimum criteria are fulfilled before 
calculating the net settlement obligations of each participant. The 
  6settlement agent then completes the actual transfer of funds. Thus, the 
clearinghouse can be managed by any private, public, bank, or non-
bank organisation. However, the settlement agent needs to have the 
endowment of a guarantor and therefore central banks seem to be the 
natural choice. Consequently, separating roles is not possible in an 
RTGS system. Table 1 lists the various RTGS and netting systems 
presently in operation and planned in selected countries. 
 
Recent debates and research on interbank settlement systems have 
concentrated on the pricing of daylight overdrafts to control their use. 
Faulhaber, Philips and Santomero (1990), and Humphrey (1989) have 
examined the role and optimal design of a pricing mechanism with the 
Federal Reserve in the US. The result has been the introduction of a 
fee for daylight overdrafts which the Federal Reserve began in 1994. 
Alternatively, European central banks have decided to collateralise 
rather than price overdrafts. This choice fits the long run desire of 
European countries to progressively move towards settlement systems 
with little intraday credit exposure as evident in their desire to meet 
the Lamafalussy Standards. i.e., RTGS. These standards specify that 
European Union countries must have RTGS systems in place before 
they can be linked under an all encompassing system within the 
Union, i.e., Target.  There has already been progress in most EU 
countries including the UK which has not even joined the EMU. 
There are larger private opportunity costs to collateralising overdrafts, 
as financial institutions must deposit their loanable funds as non-
interest bearing reserves with the central bank; however, the total 
benefits of these reserves which include benefits to society as a whole 
outweigh their costs if they minimise systemic risk associated with 
settlements.  
 
2.3. Settlement  Risk 
 
Settlement risk refers to the risk that financial losses may occur when 
payment systems are used for settlement. Settlement risk is present in 
different forms to different payment systems, usually as credit, 
  7liquidity, or unwinding risk; however, the interrelationship of these 
risks can make it difficult to differentiate between them.  
 
Credit risk arises when the purchaser of an asset defaults by failing to 
settle any or all of its obligations. Credit risk is a function of the 
potential loss exposure when a buyer initiates a transaction ordering 
its bank to transfer funds but then cannot make payment without 
going into an overdraft situation. Credit risk arises when the two sides 
of a transaction do not pay simultaneously. In payments systems, 
credit risk can be separated into “first payer risk” and “receiver risk.” 
First payer risk refers to the risk faced by the party who pays first in 
case the corresponding payment is not received from the counterparty. 
Receiver risk arises when a receiver assumes that a received payment 
is final before it actually is and pays its obligation. Receiver risk also 
exists in RTGS systems when financial institutions are indirect users. 
That is, they are not members of the payments system but use a bank 
which is a member. An indirect user is exposed to receiver risk due to 
the time lag between the time its bank receives payment and notifies 
its customer. Credit risk can be easily overlooked in payment systems 
since the extension of such credit is not intentional but the result of 
routine payment operations; furthermore, such extensions usually last 
for less than one day. However, given the large size of such exposure, 
the risk can be real and significant to indirect users.  
 
Credit risk is especially acute in foreign exchange transactions due to 
the involvement of payments systems from different countries. The 
main risk in the settlement of forex transactions is that one party 
settles its part while the other party fails to do so. This is often 
referred to as Herstatt risk.
2 Such cross currency settlement risk is the 
result of non-overlapping hours of the payment systems caused by the 
differences in time zones in which the major central banks are located. 
Although credit risk is present in both RTGS and netting systems, it is 
smaller in the latter especially if there is lots of “traffic” with other 
users in the system. Heavy traffic means that the netted amount of 
payment due or owed would be small resulting in little credit 
  8exposure. Thus, a bank with little or no dealings with other banks 
benefits relatively less from the netting system’s ability to limit credit 
risk.  
 
2.4. Unwinding  Risk 
 
Unwinding risk can be the result of receivers not being able to settle 
transactions due to some instructions being revoked or unwound. 
Unwinding occurs when there is settlement failure in netting systems 
and the daily payment orders need to be revoked. Unwinding causes 
serious losses to netting users, for these users may have already used 
the amounts to make payments in other systems which will now be 
defaulted. These costs only increase in light of the international nature 
of payment systems in present day transactions. Moreover, after 
unwinding occurs, users need to renegotiate their positions which 
might lead to further financial losses. The management of unwinding 
risk is even more difficult than credit risk since the creditworthiness 
of all parties in the netting system rather than only that of the 
counterparties in the transaction needs to be verified to prevent 
settlement default. Clearly, there are high information requirements 
for the successful management of such risk since unwinding risk 
exposes every user to every other user’s risk. Unwinding risk is a 
systemic risk because of its ability to affect more than one user. The 
chain reaction caused by the settlement failure of one transaction can 
be widespread. Some netting systems allow for the day’s transactions 
to be unwound to limit the damage, but given the size of present day 
payments, this can amount to more than $1 trillion. Thus, unwinding 
can raise doubts and concerns for investors regarding the stability of 
the entire system thus creating a systemic crisis from a local 
individual settlement problem. 
 
2.5. Liquidity  Risk 
 
Liquidity risk exists when payment orders cannot be settled due to a 
lack of liquidity even though all parties are financially healthy. 
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presence is more poignant in RTGS systems since gross settlements 
require greater liquidity to settle exposing every participant to every 
other participant’s liquidity risk. Unlike other transactions, immediate 
liquidity at settlement time is crucial and even a temporary liquidity 
shortfall can create severe problems. Liquidity risk can be reduced if 
all parties in the payment system retain sufficient liquidity, i.e., cash 
or reserve balances, which can be used for clearing purposes. 
However, maintaining liquidity has serious opportunity costs to 
participants, since cash or reserve balances held by financial 
institutions do not earn interest income. Consequently, a trade-off 
exists between reducing liquidity risk and the costs of maintaining 
sufficient liquidity in the system. Liquidity risk is a systemic risk 
since a liquidity shortfall for one participant can lead to liquidity 
shortfalls for other counterparties resulting in a chain reaction of 
systemic liquidity shortfall. As mentioned before, RTGS systems are 
more prone to suffer from liquidity risk than netting systems since a 
shortage at any time would bring the entire system to a halt.  
 
Credit risk remains prevalent in all systems whereas unwinding and 
liquidity risk are more peculiar to specific systems. The degrees of 
unwinding and liquidity risk depend on the type of system in practice. 
Unwinding risk exists exclusively in netting systems whereas liquidity 
risk is present mainly in RTGS systems. If any one participant suffers 
from any of these risks, they expose all other participants as well; 
herein lies the systemic nature of the problem.  
 
3.  Risk Management in RTGS and Net Settlement Systems 
 
Recent reforms in net settlement systems in different countries have 
concentrated on reducing systemic risk as well as the interventionist 
role of the central bank in case of a systemic failure. For RTGS 
systems, efforts have centred on reducing the growing credit exposure 
of central banks. The objective of these reforms and regulations has 
been to improve the safety features of payment systems by forcing 
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(Passacantando, 1991). Bank’s exposure to such payment risks ceases 
when settlements are finalised through payments received from the 
central bank. Thus, at a very basic level settlement risk can be lowered 
by reducing the size of a bank’s exposure as well as by preventing 
unnecessary payment delays. Furthermore, it has been widely 
accepted that systemic risk in payment systems can be better 
controlled in RTGS systems rather than net settlement systems. 
 
4.  Risk Management in RTGS  
 
Central banks provide RTGS systems to commercial banks and other 
selected institutions such as government agencies, and in some 
countries, clearing houses for securities and derivatives exchanges 
(BIS, 1997). Current design issues in RTGS systems vary by different 
countries but two aspects which are commonly discussed for better 
risk management are policies for central banks granting intraday 
credit and establishing queuing systems. Intraday credit is useful in an 
RTGS system since it is able to reduce payment blockages which may 
arise when receiving banks do not execute their transactions before 
checking that the sending banks are “covered.” In an RTGS system, 
the “cover principle” ensures that the sending bank has sufficient 
reserves, or cover, in its reserve account at the central bank before 
payment execution. An important systemic risk concern in the RTGS 
system is the risk of a liquidity shortage. This risk can be reduced by 
increasing the liquidity held by the its member banks. As mentioned 
before, the opportunity costs of retaining liquidity can be high. 
Consequently, individual banks do not want to bear the entire cost of 
potential chain reactions caused by liquidity shortages and choose a 
level of liquidity which is lower than the social optimum; yet again, 
an example of how private banks do not internalise the costs of their 
activities which can have negative externalities on society as a whole.  
 
Central banks often provide minimum intraday liquidity to payments 
systems for the smooth running of the RTGS system. Although 
  11unlimited central bank intraday credit could reduce ensuing delays 
caused by the “cover principle,” it might create a moral hazard 
problem so that banks would begin to manage their intraday liquidity 
less efficiently while assuming that the central bank will bail them out 
of a liquidity crisis. Reserves held at the central bank under minimum 
reserve requirements, collateralised intraday loans/overdrafts as well 
as non-collateralised loans/overdrafts are extended to member banks 
under intraday liquidity programs. Essentially, the central banks face a 
trade-off whereby they reduce liquidity risk in the payments system 
while simultaneously increasing their own credit risk. However, as a 
central bank they realise that the social costs and systemic impact of a 
liquidity shortage far outweigh the higher potential credit risk they 
face. Clearly, central banks face less credit risk if only collateralised 
loans are made. Although collateralised loans from the central bank 
are cheaper for private banks than clearing their balances, liquidity 
risk still exists. Collateralised loans are still relatively costly to banks 
since they could invest the same collateral in higher interest bearing 
assets. Consequently, the opportunity cost still exists motivating 
private banks to hold less liquidity than is required to eliminate 
liquidity risk from the entire system. 
 
Although RTGS systems are supposed to operate continuously, some 
payment orders are not always executed. In the standard case, for 
instance, when a sending bank has insufficient funds, the payment 
order will be rejected unconditionally by the central bank and returned 
to the sender. The sending bank may then prioritise this particular 
payment order and then resubmit it to the RTGS system when 
sufficient funds are available to cover the transaction. However, the 
rejected payment order of the sending bank can lead to settlement 
delays for other banks which may have already included this payment 
in their daily liquidity management. A build up of such delays can 
cause a gridlock of the entire payment system. The systemic costs of 
such delays can be large and need to be accounted for. A bank is 
forced to delay its payment when it has insufficient liquid reserves or 
has already exceeded its permitted overdraft or credit limits with the 
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temporary liquidity in the payments systems through intraday credit. 
Similarly, banks can learn to manage their payment traffic with lower 
levels of liquidity. This option has high costs for private banks since 
they need to employ better liquidity management systems such as 
input sequencing and splitting payment orders. Each of these 
measures entail high costs including extra equipment, staffing, etc. 
Moreover, such measures to increase liquidity will benefit all 
participants in the payments system. Thus, if left to the private banks 
alone, they might not necessarily take on such costly responsibilities 
for fear of “free riders” who might take advantage of the banks who 
do incur the costs. 
 
At a very basic level, the following definitions might help to elucidate 
the problem. Humphrey defines payment reserves or overdraft limits 




The  li represents the limits for each bank while the L  is the 
aggregate limit for all of the banks in the entire system. Settlements 
occur at a rate r times the number of permitted overdrafts: 
 
Thus in order to prevent settlement delays, when overdraft limits (L) 
are reduced, the rate at which the settlement payments are made (r) 
needs to increase and vice versa. As mentioned before, some central 
banks are granting intraday credit to increase (L). Increasing (r) is a 
solution, but it imposes high costs on private banks and raises their 
suspicions about the free rider problem. Central bank intervention is 
justified since the social costs of settlement delays and gridlock can be 
large and systemic. Therefore, central banks need to consider 
subsidising the costs of increasing (r) and preventing gridlock. The 
probability (p) of gridlock and its social costs can be defined:  
r L S 
     p(G)=p(1-S) 
p(G)=p(1-Lr) 




0  p  1 
G=Gridlock 
PC=Private costs 
SC =Social Costs 
 
The key to preventing settlement delays from becoming a systemic 
problem is the probability (p)  of gridlock; ideally, private banks 
should be solely responsible for any delays they might cause and the 
subsequent costs. Since gridlock is the result of settlements which are 
not executed or (1-S), the central bank can try to subsidise the costs of 
increasing  (r)  through “optimisation” (BIS, 1998). In this case, 
increasing (r) might be considered a public good. As an alternative to 
returning the payment order to the sender, optimisation requires that 
unexecuted payment orders remain in centrally located and managed 
queuing system. In this case, the central bank retains all payment 
orders which require cover in a centrally located queue which releases 
them as soon as sufficient funds are available. Such a system might 
provide a more orderly flow of payments since the system can more 
efficiently manage payment requests which will offset and provide 
cover to each other to some extent. Of course, a moral hazard problem 
might arise if banks rely too heavily on this queuing system to manage 
intraday liquidity. It may also increase interdependence and settlement 
risk if banks begin to anticipate and direct final payments ahead of the 
queue. Nonetheless, it is at least one way to prevent the spread of a 
temporary payment gridlock into a system wide problem. Table 2 
describes the differences between queuing systems in some countries. 
 
5. Delivery-versus-Payment  Systems 
 
Another common method to reduce a specific type of credit risk, 
called principal risk, in various securities transactions in RTGS 
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eliminates the credit risk inherent in a transaction because it requires 
all payments to occur with finality at the same time. Such settlement 
procedure requires that a link exist between a real time security 
clearing system and a monetary clearing system before a securities 
transaction can be completed. The US and the Swiss use such DVP 
systems to ensure that securities are transferred from the seller to the 
buyer if and only if funds are transferred from the buyer to the seller. 
Since this requires real time payment finality in every transaction, 
DVP only works in an RTGS payments scheme. DVP can also be 
used in foreign exchange transactions to eliminate the cross-currency 
settlement risk; in this case, it is called payment-versus-payment 
(PVP). PVP requires that both systems have RTGS systems, 
overlapping operation times, and the payment orders must be sent 
during these overlapping times. While such synchronisation of 
operating hours may be easily arranged within Europe, it requires 
longer hours of operation in other places. In response, the US Federal 
Reserve plans to extend their operations to 18 hours per day by the 
end of the year, but other financial centres have not indicated any 
changes so far. Moreover, although the dollar side of settling forex 
transactions is conducted through CHIPS, an RTGS system, most of 
Europe and Japan still use netting systems.  
 
Although DVP systems eliminate credit risk, its costs can prohibit its 
immediate adoption. There are vast technical and co-ordination 
requirements which would require the absorption of greater 
information for each RTGS system in every country. Furthermore, 
another potential cost of DVP systems is its effect on increasing 
systemic risk. The linking of RTGS systems for simultaneous 
settlement of each part of forex or other securities transaction might 
reduce cross-currency settlement risk, but it can lead to further 
settlement delays. If the settlement of one part of the payment order is 
conditional upon settlement of another, a delay in one system will 
cause settlement delays in others. These delays could be the result of 
liquidity or more mundane technical problems, but in any event, 
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foreign RTGS systems due to the links between them. Therefore, 
although DVP systems eliminate some types of credit risk (cross-
currency settlement, Herstatt, etc.), they can be interrupted themselves 
for no fault of their own. This situation is only exacerbated after 
considering their potential to create systemic problems especially if 
liquidity problems occur as exchange rates and securities prices 
rapidly change (BIS, 1995). 
 
6.  Risk Management in Net Settlement Systems -- Centralised 
vs. De-centralised 
 
Although credit risk exists in netting systems, the main concern in 
these systems is unwinding risk. Unwinding risk is most prevalent 
when a netting system fails to settle. Thus, reforms and efforts to 
reduce unwinding risk focus on the reducing the probability of 
settlement failures. The BIS and other authorities have recently been 
encouraging members of netting systems to improve and pay greater 
attention to their risk management efforts. Central banks distinguish 
between “secured” netting systems and all others. In a secured system, 
credit exposures due to intraday overdrafts can be controlled ex ante 
through caps and ex post through loss sharing agreements. A secured 
system is one that is able to settle all of its net obligations at the end 
of a clearing cycle even when the largest net-debit position is unable 
to settle. Banks can establish a settlement guarantee by posting 
collateral in advance, depositing capital at the clearing house, forming 
joint back-up settlement agreements with other members, agreeing to 
a government guarantee, etc.  
 
If the settlement failure is the result of temporary liquidity problem, it 
is reasonable to assume that the central bank can play an important 
role. However, if the failure is related to a solvency problem, any 
assistance from the central banks will only exacerbate the situation in 
the long run. Therefore, it is crucial that the authorities are able to 
decipher the source of the failure. In cases where settlement failure 
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is insufficient, the central bank could offer assistance. The situation 
could be described more aptly using similar definitions as before; 
however, in this case it is the total aggregate shortfall,F, rather than 






It is also assumed that under a net settlement system, in accordance 
with the Lamfalussy standards, a temporary shortfall is appropriated 
to the other banks according to an ex-post loss sharing rule supported 
by their joint collateral,C. If F - C  0, where the total shortfall F is 
less than the amount of available collateral put forth by the private 
banks, indeed the private banks have successfully internalised the 
social costs of their activities. However, the critical situation arises 
when F – C > 0, where the total shortfall is greater than the available 
collateral. In this case, if in fact it is a problem of illiquidity and not 
insolvency, the central bank might step in to compensate for the 
temporary shortfall in the private banks’ collateral to prevent a 
systemic crisis. That is, the central bank could add additional 
liquidity, A, to the existing pool of collateral, C, so that A + C = F. By 
providing the additional liquidity A, the central bank provides a public 
good which would otherwise not be available if left to the private 
market alone. Of course, such provisions have social benefits and 
avoid possible settlement failures and their ensuing problems. Again, 
the significant factor which needs to be considered before providing 
the  A is whether it is only a temporary liquidity problem and not 
related to insolvency issues; in some cases it may be that illiquidity 
could turn into insolvency without central bank intervention.  
 
Other settlement risk management efforts in netting systems which 
have been encouraged by central banks includes direct monitoring by 
banks of other banks. The financial exposure created by one bank for 
another in this system provides a strong incentive for creditor banks to 
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have better access to information on other banks than is possible for 
central banks or other banking supervisors. However, a natural 
shortcoming in such decentralised bilateral monitoring arrangements 
in netting systems is the free rider problem. Banks realise that any 
excess losses created by a member of the netting system will be 
shared amongst all of the remaining members. This cost spreading 
feature provides less incentive for banks to monitor other banks as 
closely as they should. One solution has been to increase the costs 
specifically for that bank which has failed as an effective monitor by 
making it pay greater amounts in collateral relative to the other 
members. Such is the basic idea in Calomiris’ recent scheme for banks 
to police themselves by requiring every bank to finance a small 
proportion of its assets by selling subordinated debt to other 
institutions – namely, foreign banks – with the stipulation that the 
yield on this debt cannot be more than 50 basis points higher than the 
rate on corresponding riskless instruments (Calomiris, 1998).
3 The 
yield cap guarantees that banks cannot compensate these debt holders 
with large spreads when they participate in high risk activities. As the 
essence of Calomiris’ recommendation is to reduce these very risks, 
investors will only buy subordinated debt when they are sure that the 
bank’s activities are low risk. If in fact a bank is unable to convince 
other banks of their aversion to risk, they are not allowed to function. 
In this way, Calomiris exploits the access to greater and better 
information which other fellow bankers rather than supervisors are 
believed to have. His solution aligns the incentives of private banks 
and regulators alike by mandating that the social costs of high risk 
activities are not borne by the government alone. 
 
However, even with a larger burden in case of a failure, decentralised 
monitoring within a netting system might not promote sufficiently 
effective and intensive monitoring. This problem is further 
exacerbated when more participants enter the system. In this case, not 
only is there a greater burden as a result of more banks to monitor, but 
banks realise that potential losses are further reduced as they are 
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been considered as an alternative so that monitoring duties are left to a 
central authority. In this case, moral hazard problems may arise given 
that participants are not under the constant scrutiny of other members. 
Further complications may arise when such a central authority makes 
choices regarding the use of common resources to bail out temporary 
liquidity crises. In any case, net settlement systems seem more 
naturally attuned to private rather than centralised risk management 
methods given the information advantages participants have compared 
to regulators. However, without appropriate incentives such private 
monitoring can be inefficient and further exacerbate the large social 
costs it intends to mitigate.  
 
7.  Is Co-existence an Alternative? 
 
In considering netting systems with decentralised risk control 
mechanisms or gross settlement systems with centralised risk controls 
such as collateralised overdrafts, neither one seems to dominate over 
the other. Ideally, central banks try to minimise their credit risk 
exposure and prefer RTGS which are settled without the use of central 
bank intraday credit. Although secured net settlement systems are 
preferred by private banks, they leave the central banks far more 
exposed. Optimisation through queuing and intraday liquidity 
provisions by the central bank might promote RTGS, but the costs of 
maintaining non-interest bearing reserves or pledging collateral 
remain high for private banks. One market based solution has been to 
offer more incentives such as paying interest on end-of-day reserves. 
It has even been suggested that an active market for intraday credit 
might emerge as a result of such incentives. In this way, not only are 
the costs for private banks minimised, but the probability of gridlock 
is simultaneously reduced through market based incentives.  
 
Another solution has been to consider the benefits of each system and 
examine whether they can coexist while promoting risk control 
measures. It is possible for more than one payment system to serve an 
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1993).
4 However, research suggests that the existence of two systems 
may solicit private banks to choose the lower cost rather than the 
lower risk alternative. While netting systems are less costly for private 
banks in terms of liquidity management, they give rise to unwinding 
risk in cases of a settlement failure. Research has shown that the cost 
of holding extra liquidity in an RTGS system exceeds the benefits of 
the reduction in systemic and settlement risk (Garber, 1992). In 
Garber’s analysis, the opportunity cost of holding securities as 
collateral is estimated to be 25 basis points. The expected cost of 
settlement failure in netting systems is the actual loss on the liquidity 
advances from the central bank, A, to make up the total shortfall, F - 
C. The actual loss is calculated as the probability of repayment, i.e., if 
it is a bank failure, repayment = 0, multiplied by its net debit position. 
The results in this analysis indicate that the aggregate cost of 
settlement failure in a netting system is only half the cost of retaining 
liquidity in an RTGS system suggesting that a netting system is the 
lowest cost alternative. An important caveat is the assumption that 
central banks are assumed to be risk neutral rather than risk averse in 
this exercise – an assumption which could substantially increase the 
expected costs of settlement failure in netting systems (Folkerts-
Landau and Garber, 1992.) 
 
The present evolution of payments systems indicates that there will be 
the European RTGS systems with collateralised interest free 
overdrafts and the U.S. RTGS systems with uncollateralised 
overdrafts with interest charges. The lack of a common design of 
wholesale payments systems for the major international currencies 
suggests that there might be a preference for one system over another. 
For instance, it has been suggested that at planned levels of interest 
charges and collateralisation, the interest free collateralised system in 
Europe could cost more than the interest charge based uncollateralised 
overdraft system in the U.S. As a result of the lower total costs, there 
would be a preference to conduct all financial transaction in U.S. 
dollar terms. Given the relative liquidity of the U.S. money and 
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preferred environment for financial transactions to a point where it 
could isolate and render other markets ineffective. Therefore, in 
assessing the co-existence of systems across markets, it is not only 
important to consider the liquidity arguments of each system but also 
the relative level of interest charges and collateralisation requirements 
so as not to violate certain minimum standards by exacerbating 
distortions between different markets. 
 
8.  Policy Considerations – Shift towards Collateralised RTGS 
Systems 
 
The phenomenal growth in payment systems has not only increased 
the risk of settlement failure but the systemic impact of such failures. 
An appropriately designed payment system is crucial for financial 
stability and efficient operation especially during periods of financial 
distress. Many countries have undertaken reforms to reduce the credit 
risk associated with the growth of intraday credit exposures in net 
settlement systems and in RTGS systems with central bank provisions 
for overdrafts. To internalise some costs of the externalities in netting 
systems – namely, to prevent systemic crises – central banks have 
encouraged caps and/or charges on overdrafts and loss sharing 
agreements. Using such market based incentives, the liquidity benefits 
of a netting system are preserved as participants are required to 
contribute a limited amount of collateral to a pool (equal to the largest 
net debit position in the pool) rather than fully collateralise their own 
net debit positions. However, by and large, especially in Europe, 
recent efforts have sought to reduce intraday payments-related credit 
in netting systems by restructuring them into RTGS systems with 
collateralised overdrafts. Despite the apparent liquidity advantages of 
netting arrangements, there are several reasons to explain this gradual 
shift. First, systems, markets, and financial instruments are evolving at 
much faster rates than the political bodies who find it difficult to keep 
updating the rules to prevent abuse. Second, the immense task of co-
ordinating legal rules inherent in non-synchronised settlement systems 
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can be complex even in a co-operative and legal environment. Finally, 
central banks continue to be forced into the role of lenders of last 
resort and can limit their exposure more through collateralised RTGS 
than netting systems.  
 
As mentioned before, the replacement of netting with RTGS systems 
with collateralised overdrafts might encourage an active market for 
intraday credit. i.e., payments made during periods of low liquidity 
could qualify for discounts whereas others would pay different premia 
depending on liquidity in the market at that particular time. Again, the 
risk of insufficient liquidity within an RTGS system raises concerns 
about settlement delays and ultimately, gridlock. Some suggested 
solutions to this problem were for central banks to pay interest on 
bank reserves to encourage holdings of settlement liquidity, 
“optimise” payments through efficient queuing mechanisms, and the 
linking of RTGS systems with securities settlement systems to 
complete delivery-versus-payment.  
 
Another cost of reduction in payments-related credit in both RTGS 
and netting systems through charges on overdrafts and 
collateralisation is the pressure to create private sub-netting systems 
as low cost alternatives to RTGS systems with collateralised or 
interest bearing overdrafts (Landau and Garber, 1992). There will be 
some private financial institutions for whom the liquidity argument 
will present strong arguments to partake in such private sub-netting 
arrangements. Consequently, the very reasons – namely, better risk 
management – for which collateralised RTGS systems are replacing 
netting systems are undermined. In this case, central banks would 
hope to regulate these private netting systems but even then would 
increase the overall risk in the system by possibly distorting payment 
patterns and adding further to the externalities of the overall payments 
systems. As regulators, the ultimate goal is to find methods to 
internalise the costs of such activities, and the creation of intermediate 
private netting markets might only serve to reduce the central bank’s 
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on a temporary basis. However, in the end, as lenders of last resort, 
the ultimate responsibility lies with the central banks and to avoid 
agency problems it might be easier to actively manage such risk on 




The build up of systemic risk in netting systems is essentially the 
result of the collection of credit extensions issued by banks to each 
other. These “orders” are netted against each other and settled in cash 
or by delivery of the appropriate securities, foreign exchange, etc. at 
the end of the clearing cycle. If any of the participants in this system 
default by exceeding their net debit position, it may be necessary to 
unwind the entire set of transactions. Another type of settlement risk 
in netting systems is caused by the lag in payments so that a 
participant who is owed a payment prematurely considers it final. 
That is, there may be a habit of assuming payment finality even 
though in the interim settlement lag, the payee may receive additional 
information from elsewhere in the system which might affect the 
status of the final payment. Clearly, there are advantages to accessing 
such information especially for private banks who can minimise the 
costs of maintaining liquidity for payment purposes, but in cases of 
settlement failures, the potential for systemic disruptions is large. 
RTGS systems try to eliminate such systemic risk by posting early 
warning indicators into payments and settlement systems. They 
require financial institutions attempting to make a payment or effect a 
settlement to post “cash in advance” (or collateral or securities). 
RTGS systems do not allow the insolvency of a single financial 
institution to be transmitted to others through the payments system 
since settlements are never conditional on the solvency of the paying 
institution.  
 
Most EC countries have indicated their strong preference for adopting 
RTGS systems in the very near future. For some of these countries, 
  23their reasoning lies in removing interbank credit altogether from the 
payments systems to reduce the “inherently uncontrollable” nature of 
interbank credit in netting systems.
5 Others in the EC have questioned 
the legal standing of netting systems, particularly the lack of a 
common approach to insolvency and its effects on multinational 
participation which might cause the entire system to be unwound. The 
use of RTGS systems has only recently become more widespread. 
This delay is in some part due to the significant liquidity costs 
discussed before. These costs can be lessened if central banks were 
willing to pay interest on reserve balances, encouraging financial 
institutions to hold larger clearing balances in excess of the legal 
minimum. These balances coupled with collateralised overdrafts 
would not only provide greater liquidity for RTGS systems, but the 
collateral could also support delivery-versus-payment securities 
transactions. One way by which collateralisation internalises the costs 
of the risks in payments systems is by reducing the threat of gridlock. 
In some ways, such collateralisation is a way of privatising the 
clearing and payments systems. It not only reduces the need for 
central banks to monitor and control risk taking by financial 
institutions, it limits the extent of the financial safety net.  
 
One way of resolving the apparent conflict between different 
approaches towards establishing payment systems is to recognise that 
there is a trade-off between the efficiency of the financial system and 
the amount of risk assumed by the public sector. To the extent that 
regulatory differences between countries exist at any point in time, 
they will reflect national preferences and judgements regarding risk 
and efficiency, and national preferences on the risk-efficiency 
spectrum at that particular time. On the other hand, given the large 
value and international nature of present day wholesale payments, the 
effects of any disruptions arising could pose a systemic threat around 
the world. Consequently, while it is important that each country 
decide on its degree of regulatory action, the systemic nature inherent 
in a single settlement failure requires the establishment of at least 
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collateralisation requirements, or loss sharing agreements.  
 
Differences in financial innovations and technological advances in 
recent years might play a role in encouraging market participants to 
engage in regulatory arbitrage. If financial regulation is too restrictive 
in one jurisdiction, both providers and users of financial services can 
simply move to a less restrictive and less costly jurisdiction. 
Competitive pressures could result in financial centres becoming 
engaged in competitive deregulation. This could lead to a bare 
essential approach to financial regulation as authorities compete to 
have firms locate within their jurisdictions resulting in a less than 
socially optimal level of regulation overall. There are important 
implications for domestic and international payments systems. If 
financial institutions engage in regulatory arbitrage, it is important for 
different national authorities to co-ordinate the regulatory policies in 
order to avoid not just the risks inherent in competitive deregulation, 
but also the dangers of lax rules in one country having an adverse 
effect on the ability of other countries to enforce financial regulations. 
Furthermore, to the extent that regulatory laxity represents a higher 
level of risk, the possibility of systemic spillover effects on more 
conservatively regulated jurisdictions needs to be considered. Finally 
as discussed earlier, although different regulations to some extent will 
expectedly exacerbate distortions between markets by providing 
certain advantages and disadvantages to different participants, they 
should all uphold at least certain minimum standards. 
 
Thus, there is obviously a clear need for the co-ordination of 
regulatory policies. In this regard, national authorities will have to 
find a balance between national autonomy and co-ordination with 
other authorities. Since the economic case for international policy co-
ordination in wholesale payment systems is based on the presence of 
cross-border transactions and spillover effects, these could be used as 
points of reference in determining the boundaries of co-ordination 
efforts on regulation. Herring and Littman have argued that measures 
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stability should be directed by national preferences, while 
international co-ordination efforts should focus on issues of global 
systemic significance (Herring and Litman, 1995). This raises 
questions of whether the regulatory framework should be focused on 
the organisation of markets rather than institutions. Systemic stability 
regulations tend to be institutionally focused and this follows directly 
from the nature of systemic risk which is assumed to be triggered by 
institutional insolvency. However, one of the features of financial 
markets today is the increasing blurring of distortions between 
different types of financial institutions and other related agencies, i.e., 
in this case, clearing and settlement agents. The evolving nature of 
their various roles means that regulations which are too narrowly 
focused will be rendered obsolete very quickly. Thus, the importance 
of institutional focus within an international context is further 
highlighted within a regulatory framework to manage systemic risk in 
payment systems. 
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1.  Only a few decades ago, this risk was relatively low when the 
daily payment flow of foreign exchange transactions was 
roughly equivalent to the capital stock of a single large US bank. 
However, recently the average daily turnover has exceeded the 
combined capital of the top 100 US banks. 
 
2. In  1974,  Bankhaus Herstatt – a small German Bank active in the 
forex market – went into liquidation after the German part of its 
trades was irrevocably settled but before the US side was settled 
through CHIPS.  
 
3.  Although there are many difficulties in Calomiris’ argument, he 
suggests some solutions from the outset, e.g., to avoid 
“cronyism” and collusion within a specific market, buyers of 
such subordinated debt would have to be outsiders, i.e., foreign 
banks.  
 
4.  The net settlement systems, CHIPS and FEYSS, depend for final 
settlement on the gross settlement of the Fed and the Bank of 
Japan, respectively.  
 
5.  Bank of England, 1998. 
 
  27Table 1: Funds Transfers Systems in Selected Countries 
 
Country  Name of RTGS System  Type  Year of Implementation 



































































Sweden RIX RTGS 1986 
 
Switzerland SIC  RTGS  1987 
 
United Kingdom  CHAPS 













Cross Border  ECU  RTGS  1983 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (1998) 
 Table 2: Intraday Credit Policies and Centrally Located Queues in RTGS Systems 
 
Countries Whose RTGS 
Systems Provide: 
Centrally Located Queue  No Centrally Located Queue 
Central bank intraday credit  Belgium United  Kingdom 
  France United  States 
  Germany  
  Italy  
  Netherlands  
  Sweden  
No central bank intraday credit  Switzerland Japan 
 
*BIS, 1997-1998. 
  29  27REFERENCES 
 
Bank for International Settlements (1990), Report of the Committee 
on Interbank Netting Schemes of the Central Banks of the Group 
of Ten Countries, Lamfalussy Report, Basle. 
 
Bank of England, (1998) “The Development of a UK Real-Time 
Gross Settlement System,” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 
34: 163-168. 
 
Bank for International Settlement, Annual Report, various years. 
 
Duncan, G., (1994) “Clearing House Arrangements in the Foreign 
Exchange Markets,” Speech at the International Symposium on 
Banking and Payment Services (Washington D.C.: Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System) 
 
Eatwell, J., and Taylor, L., forthcoming, The Future of Financial 
Regulation: World Financial Authority. 
 
Edwards, F., (1996) The New Finance: regulation and Financial 
Stability, Washington: AEI Press. 
 
Eisenbeis, R., (1995) “Private sector solutions to Payment Systems 
Fragility,” Journal of Financial Services Research, 9: 327-49. 
 
Garber, P., and Weisbrod, R., (1992) The Economics of Banking, 
Liquidity, and Money, Lexington: DC Heath and Co. 
 
Humphrey, D., (1989) “Market Responses to Pricing Fedwire 
Daylight Overdrafts,” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 
Economic Review, Vol. 75. 
 
  28  29
Kasman, B., (1992) “A comparison of Monetary Policy Operating 
Procedures in Six Industrial Countries,” Quarterly Review, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Vol. 17. 
 
Richards, H., (1995) “Daylight Overdraft Fees and the Federal 
Reserve’s Payment System Risk Policy,” Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, Vol. 81. 
 
Schnadt, N., (1994) The Discount Rate of Bank Bills on the UK 
Money Market, London School of Economics, mimeo. 
 
Vital, C., (1994) “An Appraisal of the Swiss Interbank Clearing 
System,” Speech at the IBC International Payment Systems 
Conference (London, April 1994) 